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THE 
STORY O F  THE 
FRONTIER PROVINCE 
p e a l j a w a r  
PBIKTED AND PUllLIsHED AT THE ~ o v E I E W B N ~  PEEBE. 



I N T B O D U C T I O N  
- 
HE traveller who crosses the Indus leave8 India 
behind and enters the outworks of Central 
Asia, a region of mountain and valley popu1s;ted 
b y  a virile race of highland warriors. Even the  
new-comor oan appreciete t h i ~  fact as he looks st 
the types of humenity around him and sees the 
Indus as the outer ditch and the hills as the 
wall and projeoting buttresses of a mighty 
fortress. 
The fortre86 ha6 numerous gates, soreened 
from view at a distance, through which has poured 
every invasion of India from the beginning of 
history. Banjit Singh, one hundred years ago when 
he had established his rule over the Punjab, saw 
this picture and hastened to close the gates and 
push back through them the outposts of the enemy 
that threetened him. The power of the British 
Empire succeeded Renjit Singh and for seventy 
odd years has spent blood and treasure i n  the 
watch rand ward of the Frontier and building up 
there a stable wall of defence against invasion. 
I t  is in the attempt to sketch the history of 
these gateways and to tell something of the 
character of the people who dwell in their 
neighbourhood and of the work of the gate-keepers 
that this book is written. 
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CHAPTER I. 
-
Early History. 
HE key to the History of the North-West T Frontier lies in recognition of the fact that 
i t  has always been more closely connected with 
Eastern Iran - from which sprang Afghanistan - 
than with India. Early history flnds the Iranians 
dominating the whole Indus valley, to be  
sucaeeded by the Greeks. Alexander the Great 
oame down the valley of the Kabul River and 
Greek generals ruled as satraps, till they i n  
turn gave way to the Hindu dynasties which 
introduced Buddhism. After the death of the 
Great Asoka in  the year 231 B. C., the Countrg 
witnessed the rise and fall of many more or lese 
petty rulers till, early in  the Christian era, the 
Central Asian highlands disgorged the Eushane. 
For some 600 years the dominion of these nomads 
and their successors continued and the period 
was one of great development in Art and 
Religion, especially in the reign of Kanishka, who 
extended his rule over Northern India as far se 
Benares. Meanwhile the Mohamedan advanoe 
from the west had been coming nearer. Kabul. 
flrst felt the shook in A. D. 655, but the force of 
the invasion was deflected for a time towards 
Multan and Sindh. The establishment of the 
Ghaznavid dynasty at the close of the 10th 
Century marks the real beginning of Mohamedan 
rule and early in the 11th Century the famoue 
Mahmud of Ghazni held all the trans-Indus 
portion of the present Frontier Province in fief. 
From this point on the story of the Province 
is one long and somewhat bewildering series of 
invasions and oounter-attacks by the warring 
Yohameden dynasties who made the history of 
Northern India, down to the time of the Sikh 
Kingdom and the coming of the British. 
Mohamed of Ghor, Chengiz Khan, Timur, a11 
debouched from this gateway of Central Asia on 
to the plains of India and all left their traces on 
people and country. To them succeeded the 
Afghans, and the present distribution and 
composition of the inhabitants of the North-West 
Frontier are directly and clearly traceable to the 
continuous pressure from the north and west 
of Afghan tribes upon the earlier inhabitants 
and, again, of still more Afghans upon the flrst 
comers. 
Even at the height of Moghal power the  t' 
Frontier knew no peace. Tribe warred against 
tribe, Governor against Governor; the central 
power intervened to establish its rights only t o  1 see fresh disturbances arise immediately. And I 
all this time there was no frontier where "the , 
Frontier is now. All territory west of the  
Indus was part of Afghanistan, though the latter 
term was not then in use. The Borderland was 
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no part of India end, as India did not hold the 
gates, she had no protection from recurring 
invasion. 
Before leaving the era-0fIMohemedan rule and 
describing the coming of the Sikhs i t  is necessary 
to relate in somewhat greater detail the closing 
phases of the former and the birth of the Afghan 
Kingdom as it now exists. I t  has been shown 
that the country which is now Afghanistan was 
an outlying province of the Moghal Empire. The 
deoay of that empire, synchronising with the 
disintegration of the Saffavi dynasty in Persia, 
provided the opportunity in  the middle of the 
18th Century for a Turkoman bandit named 
Nadir Shah - th name which is still used on t h e  
Frontier and in  the Punjab to  signify any 
particularly outrageous aot of tyranny or cruelty. 
Nadir Shah won the throne of Persia by driving 
back the Afghans and Russians who threatened 
the country, and then seoured the services of the 
Afghans for the invasion of India by allowing 
the Moghal Governor of Kabul to retain his 
position as a feudatory. Assassinated while 
returning, laden with booty, from the sack of 
Delhi, his throne and his treasure fell to one of 
his generals, Ahmed Shah, the founder of the 
I 
Durrani Empire. Though this Empire did not 
long survive its founder, from it grew Afghanis- 
tan. In  the height of his power Ahmed Shah 
ruled Sindh, the Ilerajjat, Kashmir and the Punjab 
4 
3 
aa far as 'Lahore, as well as Peshawar tlnd al l  
that  is now Afghanistan, with Baluchistan and 
slices of Persia. But he lived too late and hie 
8uccessOrS were too ineBcient to carry on the 
old tradition of invasion of India. The Sikh 
power in the Punjab was growing and, behind 
it, the Brit ish were beginning to take an interest 
i n  preventing aggression from the North. 
Taking advantage of the chaos and misrule 
which followed Ahmed Shah's death, the Sikhe 
between 1818 and 1834 occupied Peshawar 
and the trans-Indus country up to  the hills. 
Their ru le  over the country was that of the 
sword alone, but  it brought the first Englishman 
actually t o  administer a portion of the Frontier, 
when Herbert  Edwardes, in the service of the  
Sikh Durbar, went to Bannu in 1847. It 
produced other noted figures too in the persons 
of Hari Singh, who first took Peshawar from the 
Afghans a n d  was later defeated and killed b y  
them near t h e  mouth of the Khyber, and General 
gvitabile, t h e  Italian, who governed Peshawar 
for the Sikhs from 1838-1842. 
Side b y  side with the Sikh advance the interest 
of the East India Company's Government i n  
Frontier Affairs had been increasing. Actually 
the  first Englishman to meet the Afghan was 
Mountstuart Elphinstone, who had been sent in 
1809 to  Peshawar t o  meet Shah Shuja, then on 
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the throne of Kabul. It Was not  till 1837, 
however, that British official relations with 
I Afghanistan commenced. The occasion was the need of a counter-stroke to  the  threatening i i attitude of Russia in  the north. Lieutenant 
111 \ Burnes (afterwards Sir Alexander Burnes), who had passed through K&bul five years before on a journey to Bokhare, was sent as Envoy. Burnes' 
/ I  mission led directly to the First  Afghan War. \ I  The terms on which the reigning Amir, Dost 
I Mohamed, Barakzd, was ready t o  accept 8 
British legation were rejected and t h e  resolution 
Was taken to replace him on the throne by  Shah 
I Shuja, the last survivor of the Durranis, living at 
the time as a refugee in India. 
The execution of this policy began with the 
advance of an army, 21,000 strong, under Sir 
John Keane, via the Bolan Pass. Shah Shuje 
was crowned in Kandahar in  April 1838 and, 
after Uhazni had been taken b y  storm, Dost 
Mohamed fled and Kabul was occupied in 
August. The bulk of the army was then with- 
drawn, a force 8,000 strong being left in  Kabul 
to support Shah Shuja and the British Envoy, 
Sir W. Macnaghten, who had Sir A. Burnes as 
his oolleague. For two years these conditions 
continued. Dost Xohamed surrendered in 
November 1840 and was given honourable 
ssylum in India. The outward calm lulled tho 
politiael authorities into oblivion of the 
unpopularity of the new Government and neglect 
of warnings. Revolt broke out suddenly on 
November 2nd, 1841. Burnes and other offlcers 
were murdered and disaster followed disaster. 
The incapacity of the British command was only 
surpassed by the treachery of the Afghans. On 
December 3rd Sir William Nacnaghten was 
murdered in open counoil by Akbar Khan, the 
son of Dost Mohamed. On the Oth, after a 
convention had been signed guaranteeing. safe 
conduct on condition of our evacuation of the  
country, the force, still 4,600 strong with 12,000 
followers, set out from Kabul for Jelalabad. 
The rest of the story is only too well known. 
Confusion, privation and massacre, culminating 
in  the slaughter i n  the Pass of Jagdalak, left 
only 20  men t o  muster at Gandamak on the 13th. 
Only :one man, Dr. Bryden, wounded and half 
dead, atruggled into Jelalabad to tell the tale. 
Kandahar under Nott and Jelalabad under 
Sale still  remained in British hands and, 
from these bases, retribution was undertaken. 
Pollock foroed the Khyber, relieved Jelalabad 
and re-oocupied Kabul by September 1842 and 
was joined there by Nott. The Citadel and 
Bazaar of Kabul were destroyed, after which 
Afghanistan was evacuated and Dost Mohalned 
returned to the throne. Though the story of the 
flrst Afghan War is a sorry one from the British 
point of view, there arose from it results which 
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Were to prove of far-reaching importance not 
many years later. ~ o s t  Mohamed had learnt in 
India the strength of the British power. While 
determined to brook no interference i n  the  
internal affairs of Afghanistan and refusing t o  
allow even a British envoy a t  Kabul, he had 
fully made up his mind never again to  pit his 
strength against Great Britain in the fleld. 
CHAPTER 11. 
-
British Bule, 1849-1901; 
HE ooming of the  Sikhs to the Frontier has T been described. The succession of the 
British to  their rule  and the acceptance of 
aeeponsibillties far beyond anything accepted by 
them followed naturally from the Second Sikh 
War. I n  1849 the country up to the foot of the 
Frontier hills became part of the Punjab, The 
five dintriots of Hazare, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu 
and Dera Ismail Khan were formed and were 
adminiatered on the same system ae the rest of 
the Punjab, but a special irregular Military force 
was r a i ~ e d  and mttintained under the direct 
orders of t h e  Government of the Punjab for the 
defenoe of the border. This was the famoue 
Punjab Frontier Foroe - " the Piffers" - and 
oonsieted a t  first of the Corps of Guides, flve 
regiments of cavalry, flve battalions of infantry, 
three light field batteries, two garrison batteries 
and two sompanies of sappers and miners. 
Changee of composition and constitution 
occurred from time to time in thie force, 
until it was flnallg removed from it8 special role 
by Lord Kitchener in 1903 and made part of the 
general service Indian Army; but the recorde 
and traditions of the old Force are carried on by 
the famoue regiments which are still entitled to 
the letters G G  Pa 3.7 after-their names. 
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The Frontier had experienced for a bare eight 
Years the flrst beginnings of settled rule, when 
the Indian Mutiny buret forth and threatened t o  
engulf far more than this outpost of the Empire's 
defences. The intervening years, though hardly 
a period of peace, had witnessed no seriouer rising. 
The " Piffers '' had been " blooded '' in dealing 
with rehectory tribes on the Htlzara (Black 
Mountain) border, with Mohmand maraudere 
round Peshawar and in punitive operations in 
the Kohat Pass and on the Kohat and Perajat 
borders. Further, we had thus early been 
drawn into an advance up one of the valley 
gateways through the mountain barrier by the  
attempts of the local Afghan Governor to annex 
the Kurram. 
The highest tribute to the effect of these few 
Yeare of British rule on e people whose turbulent 
history has been briefly sketched in the 
foregoing chapter is to be found in their attitude 
during the Mutiny period. When news of the 
events at Meerut and Delhi reached Psshawar 
by telegram, those in charge of the situation 
might well have despaired. The Afghan situation 
was menacing. Since 1842 Doeti Mohamed had 
been strengthening his position and extending 
his power. We had fielped him against 
Perdan aggression in Herat and he had finally 
come in person to Peshawar in 1857 and signed 
with Sir John Lawrence e treaty of definite 
allirtnce. But -the ink of these signatures 
was hardly dry and none could tell whether the 
Amir would give way to the temptation of an  
opportunity, such as was never likely to recur, 
of regaining his lost Indus prolvinces alid the 
City of Peshawar, that jewel in the plain which 
was, and perhaps still is, the desire of every 
Afghan ruler's heart. It is a matter of history 
that not only did the Amir entertain this idea, 
but the ruler of the Punjab seriously considered 
handing the Peshawar valley over to him and 
withdrawing to the Indus. The tribes had one 
eye on the  Amir and the other on tho British 
Frontier olllcers and Military commanders. The 
latter proved worthy of the occasion. The 
Rindustani troops in Dera Ismail Khan and 
Kohat were disarmed without difficulty. Within 
24 hours the  Guides set off on their memorable 
march t o  Delhi. On May 21st the 66th Native 
Infantry rose in Mardan - only to perish in the 
ruthless pursuit led by John Nicholson or later 
at the hands of the men of the Hazara hills. 
Next day the three mutinous regiments at 
Peshawar were disarmed successfully. These 
examples turned the scale. Help came flocking 
in from all sides, trans-and cis-border; Edwardes 
and Nicholson called on their old friends, the  
ohiefs of the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan 
districts, and met with a ready response. Levies 
and irregular regiments of horse and foot were 
raised and rapidly despatched Delhi-wards. The 
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next few monthe were not free from anxiety; 
One other Native regiment had to be disarmed 
and one attempted to regain its arms and 
was practically annihilated in oonsequence. 
Fanatical enemids tried to raise the border tribe@ 
against ua, but  one salutary lesson at  Narinji, on  
the Buner border, euficed to quell such attempts. 
The Frontier i n  the Mutiny not only fllled its 
proper role as the guardian of the  gate from 
externsl aggreesion, but  helped and helped very 
materially in  dealing with the internal situation. 
Instead of marking a set baok or complete 
destruction of the young administration, the  
Yutiny year is now looked back on by oBcials 
and people as one of untarnished honour, and 
the Pathan gentleman to-day who cannot produce 
as his most cherished heir-loom a faded bit of 
Mutiny medal ribbon or a letter of commendation 
from Edwardos or Nicholson to his grandfather 
feels that  there is o . blank space i n  his 
escutoheon. 
The twenty years succeeding the Mutiny, 
though militarg operations ranking as:expeditions 
were undertaken on eleven occasions, formed on 
the whole a period of quiet development. The 
Black Mountain tribes roquired a force of some 
15,000 men to bring them into subjection in  1868 
and in 1863 the Ambeyla campaign, on t h e  
Bunor border, which had been initiated as little 
more than a counter-raid, developed, owing to 
unexpeotpd opposition, into a serious oampdgn 
whioh ooat us over 900 i n  total casueltios. 
It was during the latter part of thifi period 
that  recognition mas first given to the principle 
of employing Militia and Levies ns the flrst l ine 
of Border defence. The Punjab Frontier Force, 
aelled upon to act  i n  conjunction with a n d  
perform t h e  duties of regular troops, had already 
lost the rough and ready character with which 
i t  originated and a, more loosely constituted a,nd 
local organisation was needed for the  every day 
work of dealing with raids and petty trouble 
with the tribes. A further valuable object i n  
enrolling purely local levies was - and is - t h e  
opportunity it gave of utilising in the defence of 
the border the custom of the country as regards 
local communal responaibility and of giving 
employment to the  young men of the tribe. 
After this period of oomparative quiet 
progress was interrupted by the Second Afghan 
War. Amir Dost Mohamed had died in  1883 
and it was not ti11 1888 that his son, Sher Ali, 
was firmly sstablislled on the throne. Though 
he owed much a t  this time to the Rusaians, 
Sher Ali feared them and turned to Great 
Britain for support. A variety of circumstances, 
however, tended to estrange relations between 
tho two countries and the Amir loant more and 
more towards Russia. The flnal oerrua belll 
was the refusal t o  accept a British mission a$ 
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I n  consequence of this Sir ~Donald Stewart 
occupied Kandahar ; Sir .~ reder ick  Roberts 
crossed the Peiwar Kotal and the Shutargardan 
and menaced Kabul .and another column 
advanced to Jelalabad. The first campaign 
ended i n  May 1879 with the flight and death of 
Sher Ali and thdconclusion with his son, Yakub 
Khan, of the Treaty of Gandarnak, whereby, f o r  
the flrst time, Afghanistan placed her  foreign 
relations under the control of Great Britain in 
return for guarantees, and a British Envoy was 
accepted a t  Eabul. When all seemed well, the 
British Envoy, ~avagnam, was murdered and his 
escort of " Guides y 3  were massacred after n. 
heroic defence. This tragedy was quickly 
avenged by Roberts, who won the  battle of 
Charasia and occupied Eabul. Yakub E h a n  
surrendered and was sent to  India. Six months 
later Abdur Rahman, a nephew of Amir Sher 
Ali, returned from his retreat in Russia a n d  
gained the  throne of Kabul. To all intents a n d  
purposea he ratifled the Gandamak Treaty a n d  
was recognised as Amir of al l  Afghanistap excepe 
Eandahar. The attack on the  latter City b y  
Agub Khan, another olaimant t o  the Amirship, 
resulted in  the defeat of a British force at 
Maiwand, in retaliation for which Roberts made 
his famous forced march of 313 miles from Kabul 
to Eandahar. The latter City was then handed 
over to  Abdur Rahman and all  British forces 
18 
were withdrawn from Afghanistan, not to set 
foot in t h e  country again for close on 40 years. 
Abdur Rahrnan became the  greatest of all Amirs 
and reigned till 1901. Throughout this time he 
realised his  dependence on India and England 
and Striotly observed his Treaty obligations, but 
he jealously guarded his internal independence. 
The course of events described above 
inevitably reacted strongly on the border tribes. 
Between 1877 and 1881 there were no less than 
twelve Frontier expeditions of a punitive nature 
on the borders of Peshawar, Xohat and Dera 
Ismail Khan. O n  the  withdrawal of the Army 
from Afghanistan in 1880, the Khyber was also 
evacuated and the Militia principle was extended 
to the defence of this famous Pass. The new 
force, raised locally from the Afridis and known 
a t  flrst as the " J e ~ a i l c h i s , ~  beoame later the 
Khyber Rifles and its history is closely connected 
with famous names such as Warburton, Nawab 
Sir Aslam Khan and Roos-Ke'ppel. 
Before proceeding with  the tale of the gradual 
development of the Frontier Administration, 
s glance forward will serve to  explain relations 
with Afghanistan from the close of the Second 
Afghan W a r  to the  time when Great Britain was 
again forced to take u p  arms against her neigh- 
bour. The close of the campaign of 1878-80 found 
British authority extended considerably in 
tribal territory and  Afghanistan correspondingly 
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& ~ e t t a  was recognised and the boundary advanc- 
ed  to the foot of the northern slopes of the  
Khojak range, half way on the road to  Kandehar. 1 I n  the North, British jurisdiction was extended to the Peiwar Kotal, a t  the  head of the Eur ram valley, and to Landi Ehana ~tt he Eastern end 
! of the Khgber, and the  Amir renounced a l l  
0laims to these areas and to  the country and 
passes of the Mohmands. Once Abdur Rahman's 
position, after the British evacuation of his 
C O U ~ ~ ~ Y ,  became clear, the  main p r e - o ~ ~ ~ p a t i ~ n  
of the student of Afghan politics was whether 
any possible successor could hold what he 
succeeded to. This question was answered b y  
the peaceful accession in 1901 of Habibulla, 
the favourite son of Abdur Rahman. I n  1905 
the Dane Mission was received a t  Kabul and  
the terms of the treaty with Abdur Rahman 
were renewed. At the end of 1906 the Amir 
visited India, returning in Narch 1007. The 
L oonclusion shortly afterwards of the  Anglo- Russian agreement removed the pressure of the  
Russian menace. 
Though concrete results of ~ a b i b u l l a ' s  visit 
to India were not perhaps very obvious a t  the  
time, the consequences were f+r-reaching. The 
impression he then gained of British might and 
British. character kept him unwaveringly on our 
side during the Great War. On the other hand 
the visit iteolf, followed by an Over-anthusiastic 
attempt to develope his country under the 
guidance of European experts and n, somewhat 
childish addiction to Anglicised habits and 
luxuries, which he had acquired in India, made 
him very unpopular with his people. Though 
his policy had been vindicated by the Allied 
Victory in the War, Turco-German intrigue had 
worked upon private and dynastio jealousies and 
his general unpopularity created the atmosphere 
which rendered possible, without any popular 
outcry, his murder in 1919 and the seizure of 
his throne by his third son, Amanulla. 
With a strong? hand governing for the flrst 
time in history a clearly deflned Afghanistan and 
the gates closed against aggression, the  develop- 
ment of the Frontier proceeded normally from 
1880 to 1897. With the exception of punitive 
expeditions on the Black Mountain i n  the North 
and against the Sheranis in the South, the 
flghting of this period was connected with the 
gradual extension of British control over the 
Frontier tribes, necessitated, as ever, by the 
responsibility of giving security to the settled 
dist~icts on the border and to India as a whole. 
These forward movements were as follows. I n  
1891 the ridge of the Samana was occupied in 
order to oontrol the Orqkxais and to proteot the 
Miranxai valley, which it flanks. I n  1892 the 
Kurram valley was peacefully occupied. Since 
the v@lley tied been declared free of the Amir'e 
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jurisdiction, as already related, chaos had 
reigned and the inhabitants of the valley were 
alternately guilty of aggression against their 
Afghan neighbours anti sufferers from their 
retaliation. Finally the suggestion of the Amir 
that it was the duty of the Briti~ih "Raj 7 9  t o  
control them, coupled with tho Turis own plea 
that the only alternative to British occupation 
was submission to Afghanistan, led t o  the setting 
up of the loose form of administration which has 
continued, to the general satisfaction of ell 
parties, to this day. This move, incidentally, 
brought on to the stage of the Frontier a player 
who was soon to fill a star part and for many 
years was destined to head the bill. Roos- 
Keppe19s name will appear again in these pages. 
It was as Political OfEcer and Commandant of 
the Kurram Nilitia that he made his debut. 
The opening up of connection between 
Baluchistan and the Punjab Brontier vla the 
Gumd Pass in 1890 led to another advance. In  
1893 Sir Mortimer Purand had concluded rt 
convention which defined the limits of the 
British and Afghan spheres of influenae over the 
greater part of the long belt of Independent 
Tribal territory. Un er this convention the 
Waziristan. 
4, Amir renounced all &aim to influenoe i n  
However, When an escort went up  to Wana 
in 1894 with the Political officers sent to  
demarcate the " Durand Line," the lznrest .which 
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had been prevalent for some years culminated 
in  a flerce night attack on their camp. I n  
consequence of thi6 s punitive expedition 
over-ran Mahsud Wazir country and, in  the 
following year, an advanoe was made into the 
territory of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs and Daurs 
of the Tochi valley. It was decided to take 
tho whole of Waziristsn under closer control 
and Political agents  were posted to Miranshah 
and Wana with garrisons found by the Punjab 
Frontier Force. Thus the Agencies of Northern 
and Southern Waairistan were constituted. 
Yot another advance, this time in the North, 
was necessitated partly by the conduct of the 
tribes, partly as a countermove to Russian 
advances in the Pamirs. Chitral had flrst been 
visited in 1885 b y  Sir William Lockhart and, 
subsequently, the Government of India had 
maintained friandly touoh with the rulers of 
the  country. From 1882 onwards a struggle for 
the  throne had kept the country unsettled. I n  
1895 one of the claimants, assisted b y  Umra 
Khan, the  Pathan chief of Jandol, attacked 
Chitral and besieged the British Agent, Major 
Robertson, who had come from Gilgit to instal 
ao Mehtar the nine-year old Shuja-ul-Pllulk. After 
the  relief of this siege by a force which 
advanced from Nowshera" under Sir Robert Low 
and e column from Gilgit under Colonel Kelly, 
garrisons were stationed on the Malakand Pass 
end  at Chrikdara and Chitral and the Political 
Agency of Dir, Swat ~ n d  Chitral wacl constituted. 
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The Frontier tribes had watched this penetiration 
Of their hitherto independent valleys with 
growing anxiety. The demarcation of the 
Durand Line, with its accompanying deanition 
Of spheres of influence; the setting up  of 
Politioal agenoies and, finally, the  passage of 
troops in all directions through their teI?ritoW 
and the garrisoning of those tracts, which were 
not only strategically important but the most 
fertile portions of tribal country - all this was 
regarded as part of e deliberate menace to  their 
independence. Such a menace was bound t o  
arouse the ever-present fanaticism of the Pathan 
and there were not wanting those to fan the 
smouldering flres of this spirit t o  flame by the  
appeals to religion. Specific grievances were 
played upon, all the passions of the  Pathan were 
whetted by appropriate preaching b y  Nullas 
and intriguers, and suddonly that happened 
which had never happened before. I n  the 
presence of what they considered a common 
danger, the tribes found some sort of union. 
Their democratic spirit could not permit, even 
under such conditions, any unifled leadership or 
councils, but a comparatively trisling and isolated 
incident set the whole Frontier in  a blaze. 
This flrst inoident was the attack, on June  
loth, on the Politioal Offlcer of the Tochi and 
his- esoort at Maizar. This village in  the  Upper 
Tochi valley had been visited in a friendly 
manner and the visitore were hospitably reoeived. 
Sulden ly  a treacherous and fanatical at tack w'as 
made a n d  all the British Military offlcers were 
killed or wounaed and numerous other casualties 
inflicted. I n  spite of these heavy initial losses, 
the  troo pa under their Indian cfflcers executed a 
retirement which lives in  Frontier history as a 
magnificent example of grit and steadiness. I 
Retribution for this occurrence was undertaken 
a t  once, but the fire had been lighted. On Jn ly  
26th the tribes of the Malakand suddenly rose, 
flooking to the standard cf an  eccentric and 
wildly fanatical Mulla. Early i n  the  afternoon 
of t h a t  fateful day so little appreheneion was. 
there of an immediate outbreak that the offlcers 
of the  Malakand garrison had gone as usual t o  
play polo at  Khar. While the game proceeded 
Mulla Mastan was setting forth from Landakai, 
only some eight miles away, with six young boys, 
hie pupils and devotees. Ere  night fell he had a 
following of thousands and was severely pressing- . 
the garrisons of Malakand and Chakdara. Thus 
quickly can the  cry of " Ghaza, 'j be responded 
to! F o r  the full story of all the gallant deeds of 
the  following few d ~ y s  the reader must be 
referred to the numerous detailed publications 
on t h e  subject. We must pass quickly to events 
elsewhere. By August 7th the blaze had  
spread to Mohmand country; a fortnight la ter  
Afridi and Orakzai Tirah were alight. Shabkadr 
was at tacked;  the Khyber Posts fell and the  
Pass was in  the hands of our enemies ; tho forts 
of Samana had been attacked and the Kurram 
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valley threatened. The southward s p ~ e a d  of the 
conflagration wae checked by the fact tha t  the 
'first outbreak had occurred - prematurely from 
the point of view of united aotion b y  the tribes- 
in  Northern Waziristan. Punitive operationsl 
were already well advanced tbere before the' 
Afridis and Orakzais rose and the troops i n  the 
Tochi were able to interpose a flre-proof soreen 
between Tirah and t h e  Mohsuds. Thus  it 
happened that the latter tribe wrta the only  one 
of importance that did not rise in  1807. 
The campaign of whioh the initial stag00 have 
been briefly reoorded above abounds in  inoidents 
famous in Frontier song and story. The  
storming of Dargai heights is perbapS t h e  best 
known inoident to the world at large. The 
Indian Army and the Frontier ofiZcia1 remember 
with even greater pride the heroic defence of the' 
ill-built, ill-found tower of Saragarhi on the 
f3amana for seven and a half ho~zrs against 
overwhelming odds by a little band of twenty- 
one men of the 36th Sikhs, who fell fighting to 
the last man before they would surrender their 
aharge, on which depended the signal 
aommunications of the ridge. 
This general rising of the tribes necessitated 
Military operations on a scale hitherto 
unprecedented onthe Frontier. Forces under  Sir 
Bindon Blood and General Elles traversed the 
whole of the Mohmand country, Bajaur, Utman 
Khel, Swat m d  Buner; and ah army of 40,000 
men under General Sir W. Lockhart invaded 
Tirah, dealing flrst with the Orakzais and later 
with the Afridie. These operations were long 
and difficult but eventually successful, and b y  
IvIarcb 1898 all the tribes from the Tochi 
northwards had submitted. The Khyber was 
re-occupied; the Khyber Rifles were 
re-established and road-making and the building 
of a new and more up-to-date system of Forts 
for the safeguarding of the Pass was commenced. 
I n  the next few years thero were no serious 
disturbances on the Frontier. The Mahsuds, 
however, though they had not risen as a body in 
1807, had been giving continuous trouble and 
had harried the Derajat with their raids. In 
December 1900 they were placed under blookade. 
This form of reprisal -oommonly used in a 
greater or less degree as a lees drastic and 
expensive alternative to  a punitive expedition- 
oonsists in forbidding to the offending tribe all  
egress from their barren mountain haunts and so 
bringing them to  subjection by cutting off the 
trade and other intercourse with British Territory 
without which existence in any degree of 
oomfort is impossible. The difficulties of 
making effective such a measure over the  
long length of the Mahsud border deprived 
the policy of 1900-1001 of success. Late i n  
the latter year the passive blockade was 
varied by numerous sudden offensive rside 
into M e h ~ u d  country. This produced the 
desired eettlement and for eome years the 
tribe gave no serious trouble. While the 
Mahsud blockade was in progress momentous 
changes had been brought about in the 
administration of the Frontier, which must be 
described in a separate chapter. 
CHAPTER 111. 
c_t.l 
The North-West Frontier Province. 
THERE had existed for many years a school of 
thought which considered that the adminis- 
tration of the  Frontier was too important a 
matter t o  form merely a portion of the duty 
and responsibility of the Lieutenant-Governor 
of the  Punjab. The latter had innumerable 
demands upon his attention in the increasing 
problems of the rapidly developing dbtricts 
east of the  Indus. Individual Lieutenant- 
Governors might o r  might not have experience 
- 
of, and sympathy with, the special characteristics 
and requirements of the Frontier. At the best 
there must  be delay, due to the many other 
important claims o n  the attention of the Head 
of the  Province, in matters that brooked no 
delay, and a lack of decision and consistency 
in  policy. So argued the separationists. Their 
opponents held that a small Frontier administra- 
tion would be  expensive and inefficient for 
lack of senior supsrvisors and that there would 
be a, tendency to subordinate the rights of the 
inhabitants of directly administered districts to 
considerations of policy as regards the tribes or 
Afghanistan. 
Schemes had been propounded from time to 
time with a view to giving the central 
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Government of India b, more direot control Over 
Frontier administration and policy and  to 
improving the relations of the British districts 
with their trans-border neighbours. The most 
important of these schemes was that propounded 
i n  1877, during Lord L ~ t o n y s  Viceroyalty ; but 
the Second Afghan War caused it to be shelved. 
The experiences of 1807 brought the subject 
again to the fore and in 1801, after much 
discussion and doliberation and i n  the face of 
considerable opposition and genuine misgiving 
in some quarters, Lord Curzon'S scheme for the 
creation of the North-west Frontier Province 
as a separate administration, under a Chief 
Commissioner specially selected b y  the  Governor- 
General, was introduced. 
I n  geographical outline the new Province 
can be readily likened to an outstretchod hand, 
the five " settled districts '3 of Hezara (cis- 
Indus), Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera 
Ismail Khan lying in the palm, while the 
thumb and five fingers stretch out to occupy 
and close against aggression the five gateways 
of the Malakand (with Chitr~tl), the  Khyber, 
Xurram, Tochi and Gumal. Incidentally, the 
clenching of the hand exercises pressure upon 
the turbulent tribal areas lying between the 
fingers. 
Side by side with the inauguration of the 
new Province Lord Curzon, with the  assistance 
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of Lord Ei tchen~r ' s  groat organising ability, 
remodelled the strategic control of t h e  Frontier. 
As far as possible regular troops were with- 
drawn from the small  garrison^ i n  the Districts 
and Agencies and concentrated in  the larger 
Cantonments, their places in the ontpost line 
being taken by an  extension of the tribal levy 
system into Militiae and Border Military Police. 
Simultaneously the bonstruction of roads and 
railways was undertaken, to ensure that the 
regular troops of the Peshawar Division and 
the Frontier Brigades could be rapidly moved 
to  any threatened point. As B part of Lord 
Kitchener9s general scheme of Army re-organisa- 
tion, the Punjab Frontier Force lost its old 
aorporate exiatenoe and its units took their 
places as par t  of the new model Indian Army, 
all portions of which were in future to take 
their share of service on the Frontier, 
For ten years from the condlusion of the 
1897 oampaign and for tho flrst seven years of 
the new Province, the Frontier onjoyed almost 
unbroken peace. This period bore fruit later. 
Though too short to work a complete or lasting 
change in the  warlike habits of the people, i t  
was long enough to dispel to Borne extont $he 
suspicion of our aggressive intentions engendered 
b y  the events of the '80's and '00's. I t  also 
served to introduce the trans-border tribesmen 
t o  the possibilities , of hitherto undreamt of  
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prospertty from peaceful trade, while the 
extension of canal irrigation from the Swat and 
Kabul rivers and, in a minor degree, f'rom the 
Indas in  Dera Ismsil Khan gave openings to  
many of them to settle down as British subjects 
to the agricultural development of land newly 
made cultivable. 
The necessity in 1908 of military operations 
Go punish the Zakka Khel Afridis for continuow 
raiding on the Peshawar border, instead of 
oeusing a sympathetic revolt of the whole 
Afridi tribe, as might well have happened had 
not the suspicions of 1807 been alleged, led to  
what "Punch" called a a Week-end War '*, the 
Afridis ae a whole promptly negotiating the  
terms of settlement with their recalcitrant 
section. A month later in the same year puni- 
tive action against the Mohmands, who had also 
been guilty of serious raiding, was complicated 
for a moment by Afghan intrigue and the parti- 
cipation of irresponsible Afghan tribesmen ; but 
our relations with the h i r  were not seriously 
jeopardised and, after their country had been 
traversed for two months by two Brigades, the 
Mohmands submitted. The rest of the Frontier 
was unaffected by these two expeditions on the 
Peshawar border, i n  spite of much fanatioal 
preaching. 
During the next few gears the storm centre 
shifted from the Pesh&war border further South. 
2 7 
Three problems arose about this time, one local 
and two affecting the whole border and Anglo- 
Afghan relations. These problems were th8 
Mulls, Powindah, the Gulf Arms Trade and the 
Outlaw Question. The Mulla Powindah was a 
Oombint~tion of priest end politician of a type 
not unknown in medieval European history, 
He attained spiritual domination over the 
Mahsuds and his efforts to extend his temporel 
power - even at one time to the extent of an  
attempt to unite the whole of Waziristan into 
0110 nation under his leadership - were at the 
root of most of our troubles in the southern 
half of t he  Province betweon lQO0 and his 
death in 1913. Throughout this period the 
necessity of military operations against the 
Mahsucls seemed imminent. The Mulla's 
influenoe countered all attempts to build up a 
solid body of representative opinion in the 
tribe, who conld settle matters with the Politioal 
authorities. The bill against the tribe for raids 
and the like was swelled enormouslg by a 
series of fanatical murders of Britieh officers, 
culminating in 1913 in the murder of Major 
Dodd, ths  best friend the MahsudY ever had, and 
two other osEcers by e trusted Mehsud orderly. 
In all these offonoee the hand of the Mulla 
was traceable end he was directly boncerned in 
an attack on Sarwakai Port in  1911. This 
incident, however, did him more harm than good. 

He organisad the attaok to rehabilitate himself 
from the effects of several previous set-backs, 
But received no general support from t h e  tr ibe 
Who promptly condemned the  action and paid 
up the fine of Rs. 10,000 levied ee a punish- 
ment. Thus, i n  spite of diBcultieS, some 
progress in  getting control over the Mahsuds h&d 
been made. To cope with the problems of the 
situation a special appointment of Resident in 
Waziristan was created and the experiment - 
very successful up to a pointl- was tried of 
enlisting Mahsuds in the Army. T h e  Mahsud 
is the finest flghter of all the Pathan races a n d  
did excellently on service until political and. 
religious considerations necessitated, i n  t h e  
course of the Great War, the discontinuance of 
enlistment of trans-Frontier Pathans. 
The Gulf Arma Trade between 1007 and  
$810 revoiutionised the Militsr y position on t h e  
Frontier. lDO7 did not mark tho beginning o f  
the change ; the importation of rifles and  
ammunition of European manufacture had 
begun soon after the Frontier rising of 1887, 
but ten years later the re-armament of the 
tribes with weapons far more effective than 
those possessed by our own Militias and  
Military Police had proceeded t o  an extent 
which could no longer be disregarded and a 
slimax was reached when a single consignment 

of 30,000 Martini Henrys was run through from 
the Gulf to Kandahar. Thirr particular 
consignment, incidently, consisted largely of 
the late armament of the Australian and New 
Zealand forces, which had received the -303 3 )  
a t  the time of the South African War, the old, 
bu t  perfectly good Martinis being sold to 
enterprising dealers, who eventually obtained 
touch, through French and  German armament 
flrms, nonderrcript tramp steamer companies, 
owners of fast sailing dhows and other devious 
channels, with the equally enterprising customer 
from the North-West Frontier. I n  three years 
1607-1009 no less than 90,000 rifles, inoluding 
an inoreasingly large number of "'303'sV, was 
run through to the Mekran coast. Most of 
these reached the tribes sooner or later. When 
the market had become suffloiently well-known, 
the  tribsmen- whose increased wealth during 
the preceding years of peace has been already 
referred to-sank all their capital in the 
organisation of gun-running oaravans. More 
especially the Adam Ehel Afridis of the Kohat 
Pass, finding the value of their "home-made" 
rifles enormously reduoed, raised every. penny 
they could and either went themselves to the 
Gulf, or entrusted their money to Ghilzai G 
oaravan leaders. 
Just when the Frontier had entered whole- 
sale upon this enterprise the Government of 
India stepped in with a naval and military 
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extent as nearly to bring abottt another Frontier 
war. I n  l B l O  the Afridis, led by the Adam 
Ehels, were in a very embittered frame of mind 
owing to their financial losses from the blockade. 
With the ingenuousness that is a refrealling, if 
a t  times annoying, characteristi0 of the Pathan, 
they demanded that Government should compen- 
sate them. This demand, and the situation 
generally, was firmly dealt with and by 1011 
the Gulf Arms Trade was to a l l  intents and 
Purposes killed. The re-armament of the tribes 
however had been effected. The relative position 
of our forcea and theirs could never again be 
t h e  same. Where formerly a dozen partially 
trained Border police with Nartini Henrgs 
could safely be sent out to meet s raiding 
gang of 30 or 40, strong detachments of 50 
were now required, A re-arming of the locd  
forces and a general re-organisation and 
re-grouping were necessitated. Also the vil- 
lagers themselves had to be  given some wider 
means of self-protection than the Indian Arms 
Act's strict interpretation allowed. Between 
1909 and 1913 the Militias were re-armed, the 
Border Military Polioe gave way to the  better 
'armed and better trained Frontier Constabulary 
and the system was inaugurated of issuing rifles 
to  villagers for their own protection and to 
enable them to co-operate with the Govern- 
rcient forces in the defence of the border. 
The third great problem o f  these years was 
outl@wry. This was one of the unanticipated 
results of the demarcation of the ' I  Durand Line," 
dejbing the limits of Afghan and British spheres 
of influence. The Pathan gradually woke up- in 
some amazement and perplexity - to  the fact 
that, however indeflnite that "Line " might be in 
the eyes of Afghan Frontier ofacials to  whom 
intrigue was as the breath of life and who could 
never resist posing as ohampions of Islam at the 
expense of the neighbouring British Government, 
i t  was regarded as s very concrete barrier to 
their aotivities b y  the absurdly scrupulous 
" Feringhis." It followed that, if an exuberance 
of spirits or the  demands of the P a t h ~ n  Code of 
Honour brought an individual into conflict with 
the  Indian Penal Code, he had only to  betake 
himself more or less hurriedly to the nearest Alsatie 
beyond tha* Line- Ningrahar and Khost were 
the favourites -to be  out; of reach of the arm of 
the Sirkar, which would assuredly have dragged 
him forth, in the old days, from any asylum he 
had sought among Independent tribes under 
political control. But, having reached hia Alsatia, 
the outlaw found that life for the landless and 
the stranger who could not pay hie footing was a 
bard problem, and he took to joining with others 
of his kidney and the more 'lawless and daring of 
his Afghan neighbours in  raiding British territory 
for loot, Soon he found that the most profitable 
form of loot w@s the prosperous Hindu of some 
village in the plain8 of Bannu or Peshawsr, or 
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the flocks or persons of hie own enemies in his 
home village. s o  grew up the pernioious trade 
of kidnapping to ransom, which is one of the 
most difEcult, if not the most difficult, of 
Frontier problems to this day. 
The difficulty is too obvious to need lengthy 
explanation. So long as outlaws from British 
territory can flnd asylum in the uncontrolled or 
ill-controlled Frontier tracts of Afghanistan, the 
local political system is  to a great extent 
defeated. Only exceptional energy, consistent 
hunting out of the inevitable harbourer' and spy 
and the seizure of every opportunity of enforcing 
communal responsibility for these offences can 
keep the scourge within limits. Inability to  
strike at the root of the trouble has undoubtedly, 
at times, produced a feeling of helplessness and 
has resulted in a slackening of effort to keep 
our own sphere of influence clear of thie blemish. 
The permanent cure csn only oome when the 
Amir can exercise e stricter control over the 
outlying tracts of hie kingdom. His difficulties 
are great and not unlike ours. In 1912 and 1913 
Ehost was in revolt and Afghan regular troops, 
driven from their forts, took refuge in the 
Eurram. He has a crowning difllculty, which we 
have not-corrupt Frontier officials whose over- 
mastering ideas are to create unrest and to evade 
the orders of their central government. The 
late Amir, Habibulla Khen, did his best, as one 
man ageinst a host, loyally to live up to his 
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treaty obligations. There is every reason t o  
hope that his son, Amanulla Khan, has the same 
intention and i s  aided b y  conditions more 
favourable to success. 
This discussion of the problems of the period 
brings us down to the outbreak of the Great 
Wnr. The years preceding that cataclysm marked 
real progress, in spite of set-backs and difficulties. 
Two subjects merit mention before we pass on to 
the War period. The rise in internal crime from 
1907 onwards, due partly to the trans-Frontier 
conditions which have been discussed in  this 
chapter, had already directed attention to  the  
question as to whether the rigid penal and 
procedure codee of India did not need some 
adaptation to Frontier conditions. An educational 
experiment of far-reaching aignificance had been 
mado in  the inauguration, under the close 
personal guidance of Sir George Roos-Keppel, of 
the Islamia College, situated on the plains 
betwoen Peshawar and Jamrud. I n  i t  many 
scions of the families of both trans- and 
cis-Frontier chiefs were receiving an education, 
which must have a, very great bearing upon the 
conditions on the Frontier in the coming 
generation. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
I_C_ 
The Frontier and the War- 
HE outbreak of the war i n  Europe had no T disturbing eEect at first. W h e n  i t  is remem- 
bered how little the significanoe of the event 
was realised even in England, it i s  no t  surprising 
that  the  Pathan should have visualised the  
position in the light of what experience he had 
to guide him. The only guides he  had were 
memories of the Mutiny and a few hazy ideas 
about the South Afrioan War. It was realised 
b y  all olasses that we were i n  a big fight, b u t  
they had never heard of the Germans and Were 
puzzled to hear of the Russians - whom they had 
been brought up to oonsider as  our  and their 
hereditary enemies -as our allies. The leading 
men of the Province, headed b y  ruling ohiefs 
like the Mehtar of Chitral and t h e  Nawab of 
Amb, came forward at once w i t h  the  willing 
offer of all their resources. Pub l i c  opinion in 
the cis-border area, whioh had seen the benefits 
of sixty Years of settled rule, w a s  unanimous in 
our support. The Independent Tribes, for whom 
those same sixty years had had a different history, 
were neoessarily an uncertain quantity. They 
looked to Kabul for a sign, and received i t  in 
the Amir's open avowal of complete neutrality. 
They were further influenced b y  t h e  large stake 
they had deposited with us in the persons of 
t f lous~nds  of their young men, serving in tho 
Indian a rm y  and local corps. A11 these were a t  
t he  moment thoroughly staunch and eager for a 
share in the fray. 
It was not long, however, before disturbing 
factors appeared. The possibility of Turkey 
being drawn in  on the side of our enemies was 
viewed with the greatest concern even by our 
best friends. The shock, when it came, was 
weathered with surprising ease. There had been 
time, i n  the intervening three months, to prepare 
the  people for the event and the Amir's re- 
i terated declaration of neutrality and condem- 
nation of the bellicose folly of the Turks was of 
incalcul&ble value, Still, the situation in tribal 
terri tory was anxious i n  the  extreme. The 
outbreak of war bad, fortunately, found no ready 
lit fire which could be quickly fanned to a blaze, 
b u t  from the  first moment fanatical Mullas and 
t h e  anti-British party i n  Kabul had been doing 
their  utmost, though without cohesion or settled 
plan, to stir up trouble. The flrst outbreak came 
from the Afghan Province of Ehost, where the 
tr ibes were deflant of the  Amir and resentful 
of t h e  reprisals, recently taken against their 
t r ade  and intercourse with India in conseqvence 
of t h e  outlaw trouble. Late i n  November 1014 
our Militia post at Miranahah in the Tochi was 
attacked from Khost. The attack was repulsed 
without serious difficulty but was repeated in 
1915 upon the outpost of Spina I(hai80ra i n  tho 
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I Upper Tochi. Miranshah and the  Tochi generally continued to be threatened by  gatherings from 
i Khost till a strong cclashkar" was severely defeated by a combined force of troops and Militia in March 1915. 
Meanwhile trouble was brewing fur ther  north. 
I n  Buner there have been settled for close o n  
100 years a strange colony, half refugee and half 
fanatic. Their origin traces back to Syed Ahmed 
of Bareilly, who acquired a tempormy ascen- 
dancy early in  the 19th Century in the plains of 
Yusafzai -now the Nardan sub-division of the 
Peshawar District -and challenged the  advancing 
power of the Sikhs. Defeated with immense 
slaughter, Syed Ahmed and t h e  remnants of his 
following found refuge in the hills west of the 
Indus. In  the early days of British rule this 
colony was a constant storm centre, b u t  for more 
than twenty yeara it had sunk into insignificance, 
though still receiving some support i n  money 
and recruite from the Wahabi Mohamedan 
I 
element of Hindustan and Bengal. With t h e  
entry of Turkey into the war, the Hindustani 
Fanatics, as they are known, again became active. 
The situation of the colony mode i t  a convenient 
l ink between the pan-Islamic and pro-Turk party, 
which was already beginning to raise i t s  head in 
Indicl, and the anti-British party i n  Kabul. 
66 .Muhajirin,"-i. e., Indian Mohamedans unwilling 
to live longer in a land at war with the  Khalifa, 
- f led to  the C O ~ O ~ Y  and wero thence passed 
oh t o  Kabul. A use having been found for the 
Fanatics, money in increasing quantities began 
to reach them from Kabul and from India. 
This digression has beennecessary because the 
Fanatics flgured largely' in  the flghting which 
Groke out all along the northern Peshawar border . 
i n  the spring and summer of 1815, and they have 
remained one of the chief danger points on the , 
Frontier ever since. I n  April 1915 the Mohmands, ' 
the most priest-ridden of all the tribes, started 
the campaign by an attack on Shabkadr. They 
were repulsed, but not defeated, and trouble 
spread. At tflis period the military forces in 
India were depleted far below the danger point, 
and stories of the terriflc nature of the flghting 
, 
in Flanders werebeginning to  reach the country- 
side through sepoys returning wounded or dis- ; 
charged. These oircumstanoes led to some 
decline i n  morale and encouraged the war party , 
i n  the tribal area, but did not affect the loyalty 
of the mass of the people. The summer of 1915 ' 
saw serious risings on the Buner border, in the 
malakand and on the Mohmand line. The latter 
led to serious flghting and necessitated the 
blockade of the whole tribe. The concluding 
months of 1915 were the most critical of the 
whole war on the Frontier. The causes specifled 
above coupled with the idea, sedulously spread 
by agitators and by a Turco-German mission 
which had arrived in Kabul, that the alliance of 
Germany and Turkey was a Holy War in which 
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Plerslia would soon join, and that then a oombin~d 
army, including Afghanistan, would invado 
India, gave increased vigour to war propaganda. 
The Amir was very nearly driven into war, but 
held his own; the Afridis, the  keystone of the 
Frontier arch, remained staunch, and the SUC- 
ceeding years showed a steady strengthening of 
our position. German and Turkish intrigue 
oontinued to the end in Kabul and in tribal 
territory, and Nohameden agitation in India 
npread its ripples to the  Frontier. By 1918, 
however, we were again strong in actual military 
resources. Masses of white tents convinced the 
boldest that we had more troops than we could 
house; the drone of aeroplanes in the sky and 
the hum of motor transport on the roads wore 
an impressive novelty and, above all, the 
remarkable staunchness of one of India's greatest 
benefactors in the war, Amir Habibulla Khan, 
oheckmated the efforts of those who would have 
made catspaws of the tribes by tales of the 
ooming again of one of the  old-time invasions 
from the North and West. 
A punitive expedition against the Mahsuds 
could no longer be postponed in 1917, but this 
was hardly a result of the war ; every effort had 
been made to stave off the necessity, involving 
as it did the employment of troops badly wanted 
elsewhere ; but an attack on Sarwakai, resulting 
in the death of the Commandant of Militia, pre- 
cipitated matters. The expedition was remark- 
able for the fact that it was carried through, 
under every conceivable disadvantage of terrain, 
communications and Weather, in the height of 
the summer by troops unseasoned to the Frontier 
and was completely success~~ul. ~t resulted in 
two Years of such peace to the Derajat as had 
not been known for nearly a decade. 
With the trans-Frontier situation well in hand, 
though a never-ceasing source of anxiety, the 
settled portion of the Province weathered the 
concluding years of the war with astonishing 
tranquility. Internal lawlessness actually de- 
creased, the war was little thought of or discuss- 
ed and very little use had to be made of the 
Indian " D. 0. R. A. *' Manifestations of loyalty 
Were constant. The Indian Army had, before the 
war, drawn largely on the fighting races of tho 
Frontier. Under strees of circumstances, already 
related, the classes enlisted from Independent 
Territory had proved unreliable and had been 
discharged. Nevertheless, during the period of 
intensive recruiting in  1917-18 a higher percent- 
age was enlisted in relation to the total male 
population of fighting age than was attained by 
any Province in India, not excepting the Punjab. 
This result was obtained in  spite of the terrible 
epidemic of influenza in the autumn of 1918, 
which claimed 93,000 victims in two months as 
against a normal death-rate for a Year of 60,000- 
~ h o u g h  the Province is far horn being a rich 
one, i ts subscriptions to War Loans, Red Cross 
funds and the like represented something like 
ton annas a.head of the p opulatiofl. 
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I t  would be misleading to attribute this 
tranquility entirely to disinterested. loyalty or 
exceptional political acumen. The fact  is that 
once the nervous period of 1915 was passed, 
when wild rumours, agitation and religious 
fervour came near to causing general demoralisa- 
tion, the high priaes obtained for agricultural 
produce, high rates of labour, soldier's remit- 
tances from the fleld and the  daily spectacle of 
the Civil Administration, though wi th  EL depleted 
staff of British Officers, going about i t s  ordinary 
business unruffled, steadied people. On the 
" once bitten, twice shy 3) principle, they listened 
less and less to prophets of disaster and came to 
regard the Turco-German Army, which was so 
often reported to have reached Herat, as the 
myth it actually was. Agitators had  no real 
grievance to wbrk on. Even the rapidly rising 
prices of food-stuffs and cloth during the closing 
period of the war only accentuated the  growing 
desire for a British victory as it was conffdently 
expected - and by wiser beads than the  Frontier 
Pathan - that peaoe would br ing immediate 
plenty. 
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The Aftermath. 
HE diagnosis of the War spirit on the Frontier T attempted at the close of the preceding 
chapter is of importance as a guide to subsequent 
events. The absence of a grievance had kopt 
things tranquil during the war. The presence 
of grievances1 prepared a fertile soil for 
aubsequent troubles. 
The news of the Armistice in November 1918 
evoked demonstrations of genuine enthusiasm on 
all sides. The prestige of the British name waa 
at its zenith and even the crushing defeats of the 
Turks in Palestine and Mesopotamia struck no 
jarring note in the general rejoicings. At flrst i t  
seemed that expectations were going to be 
fulfilled. There was an immediate drop in the 
price of neceasaries ; the bestowal of rewards for 
war services was promptly commenced and the 
general sinking back from the attitude of strain 
was facilitated by peace in  our borders and 
release from the influenza scourge. Early in 
1919 the situation began to change. One hope 
after another proved slow of realisation. The 
drop in prices turned out to be illusory and the 
cost of living rose more and more ; the release of 
soldiers who had joined up for the war emergency 
only was delayed. The people could not 
understand it all. Perplexed and with a half- 
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deflnod feeling of having beon defrauded in-their 
just hopes, they heard t h e  over-growing 
reverberations of discontent in the Punjab - the 
agitation over the Rowlatt ~ c t ,  built UP o n  a 
similar foundation of general soreness. 
Ueanwhile, when he had s tee red  his 
safely through the tempest, p r o v e d  t h e  wisdom 
of his vision and helped his B r i t i s h  allies t o  an 
extent that cannot be over-estimated, Amir 
(Habibulla Khan was foully murdered a t  
Jelalabad. The event aaused no great  s t i r  on 
the Frontier and, after an  abor t ive  a t t empt  by 
his brother, Nasrulla Khan, the throne Was 
Occupied by Amanulla Khan. The n e w  Ruler 
found his position none too secure.  T h e  news 
which reached him of events in t h e  Pun jab  and 
their echoee in Peahawar offered w h a t  h e  thought 
was a good opportunity for c r e a t i n g  a diversion. 
Misled by an entirely inaccurate appreciation of 
the eituation and with the lure before  his eyes of 
the restoration of the pristine glories of the 
Durrani Empire and the  capture of the riches of 
Peshawar, he took up a t rucu len t  a t t i tude  and 
sent troops to violate the Fron t ie r  at t h e  head of 
the Khyber. Simultaneously, overwhelming 
evidence was discovered of an officially inspired 
plot to foment disturbance in Peshawar and 
elsewhere. The Third Afghan W a r  resulted. 
At first all went well. The Afghan intruders 
in the Khyber were evicted and o u r  troops 
advanced and occupied Dakka. T h e  flghting 
which ocourred demonstrated the hopeless' 
inferiority of the Amir's troops, while the 
tranquility of the tribes and the inhabitants of 
British territory proved the worthlessness of the, 
intelligence service on which Afghan policy ha& 
been based. Jelalabad and Kabul were bombed 
from the air and all was ready for an advance 
t o  the former town, when the Amir sued for an 
Armistice. Before this could be granted, an 
Afghan advance in  the region of Thal, ably 
oonducted by the Afghan general in Khost, 
Nadir Khan, now Commander-in-Chief of the 
Afghan Army, had led to our Militia garrisons 
of the Uppor Tochi and other outlying posts 
being withdrawn to Miranshah. This was 
followed by the withdrawal from Wana and the 
Gumal. 
These events were too much for the stability 
of the Waziristan tribes and the trans-border 
elements in the Militias. The Afridis of the 
Xhyber Rifles had wavered from the start and 
the  corps was disbanded to forestall a mutiny. 
I n  Waziristan, when the withdrawal took place, 
mutinies occurrod both at Mirenshah and Wana. 
A large proportion of the men remained loyal, 
though severely shaken. Miranshah, supported 
b y  Regulars, was held ; Wana and the posts of 
the Gumal route were evacuated in face of 
opposition both from mutineers and tribesmen, 
and the loyal portion of the Wana garrison, 
retiring on Zhob, was severely handled and had 
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Rrnctically all  its British Offlcers kil led Or 
wounded. Darwesh Ehel Wnzirs and Mahsuds, 
finding the omens of victorious " GChazaY' too 
Clear to be ignored, were ready t o  rise ''en 
masse" had any further Afghan backing been 
forthcoming. As it was, the country was 
flooded with deserters with the  rifles and  
ammunition they had taken with them and 
raiding and attacks on picquets started on an 
intensive scale in the Derajat and i n  Peahawar, 
Where the state of the Afridis was much the  
same as that of the Wazirs. 
Meanwhile on August 8th EL treaty of peace 
with the Afghan Government was concluded a t  
Rawalpindi. But we were left with a border in  a 
state of turmoil from the Ehyber southwards 
and the residents of four of tho flve settled 
districts with the added grievance of insecurity 
from raids. To restore the situation time and a 
re-grouping of forces were needed. The Army 
was overdue for demobilisation and, even after 
the most pressing claims in this direction had 
baen met, it was untrained in Mountain and  
Frontier warfare, whereas the enemy to  b e  dealt  
with was more formidable than ever before, 
by reason of his vastly improved armament and  
the strong nucleus of Militia deserters, trained 
by the daily practice of years i n  just those 
tactics that they were now employing against 
us. The northern portion of t he  Frontier 
remained quiet in spite o f  the  most intensive 
hostile propaganda. Eere the lessons taught the 
northern tribes in  1915 bore fruit. The Afridis 
as a whole kept steady and, though the tribal 
Malike had a hard task in controlling their 
deserters, a settlement was gradually effected by 
political means, with little more than the threat 
of military force. With the Afridi settlement 
came into being the Khyber Khassadars-a tribal 
levy, un-uniformed and providing their own 
arms, who have now, for more than a year, 
satisfactorily fulfllled their duty of keeping the 
peace on their own tribal border. 
Further south the restoration of order among 
the tribes and of peaoe to the harried dwellers 
i n  the plains was a more serious busi~ess ,  which 
is hardly yet completed. The Rawalpindi Peace 
led to  no cessation of intrigue and minor acts of 
hostility, and the belief was sedulously fostered 
that after six months war would break out again. 
So long as this attitude persisted the efforts of 
Political officers could avail little and military 
action could with difficulty cope with the 
sporadic activities of raiding gangs. Nevertheless 
the Kohat border was gradually settled during 
1920. In Waziristan the situation amounted 
practically to  a general rising of the tribes 
end there was no alternative to the thorough 
re-conquest of the evacuated country. A start 
was made with the Tochi, where, after only 
slight opposition, terms were dictated. The 
Mahaud campaign was then undertakan and 
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I resulted in desperate battles in the wildest and 
1 most difficult country, which drew from men 
Who had served on many fronts throughout the 
World War the admission that ,  i n  his own 
country and in defence of his home, the Nabsad 
is unequalled as a fighting man. ~ r a d u a n ~ ,  and 
with heavy losses on both sides, t h e  country was 
over-run and Mahsud resistance broken down* 
The Wana Wazirs were next dea l t  wi th  and 
Wan& re-oocupied. Their behaviour throughout 
had been worse than that of any t r ibe  on the 
Frontier, showing a combination of treachery, 
lawlessness and fanaticism unrelieved by the 
flghting ability and courage of the M~lahsuds. 
The year 1021 found us wi th  t h e  back of 
resistance broken and passed i n  t h e  long  drawn 
out negotiations - interspersed with colltinual 
guerilla attecks on small bodies of troop8 - to 
settle terms and get them complied with.  This 
latter stage appears now to  b e  nearing its 
conclusion and side by side with it has proceeded 
the gradual restoration of normal conditions in 
I the neighbouring districts. With t h e  set-back 
4 which the progress of the civilising infiuances of 
! 
1 British rule had received in 1919, the  scourge of kidnapping to ransom had again raised its head 
1 and assumed menacing proportions. A quiet 
border is the flrst essential t o  t he  peaceful 
progress of the districts of the plains, and 
reasonable safety of person and proper ty  is the 
flrst claim to which the people of those dietriots 
Bave a right. I t  was more than ever necessary at 
f ,  47 
this time to meet that claim, because upon the 
groundwork of grievances which has already 
been described had been built up, during 1919 
and the following years, a structure of discontent 
and unrest which was a source of danger. 
While the settlement of the tribal difaculties 
was proceeding, a further inconclusive stage i n  
our  relations with Afghanistan had been marked 
by the Mussoorie Conference of 1920. Though 
this did something to allay the anticipation of 
another war, the effect was far more than 
counterbalanced by the Khilafat agitation ana 
Rijrat  movement. 
The delay in  tho conclusion of peaoe with 
Turkey had given time for the growth of a 
movement in India in support of the traditional 
Xhalifa of Islam. I t  has been stated already i n  
this chapter that no such feeling manifested 
itself at the actual moment of the most crushing 
defeat of the Turks; but the lapse of time 
between the Armistice end the Treaty of Sevres 
provided the opportunity for what was in  origin 
a political and anti-British agitation to obtain a 
real hold upon the devotion - often based on the 
vaguest possible conception of actual historical 
facts-of the Indian Mohamedan for the Sultan of 
Turkey, his recognised spiritual chief end the 
custodian of the Holy Places. I n  this matter 
a reversal of historioal precedent oocurred which 
i s  significant to the student of Frontier politics. 
The  disturbing influence came from India, not 
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from Central Asia. ~ h o u g h  hostile elements in  
Afghanistan were ready enough to proflt by the 
agitation, zeal for the Khilafat did not emanate 
from there. Throughout 1019 the attempt to 
arouse a widespread Mohamedan agitation with 
the  object of saving Turkey from the natural 
consequences of misgovernment and misdeed0 
had been gaining force in India. In 1020 this 
agitation flrst seriously affected the Frontier 
Province through the raising of the cry  %of 
" Hi.irat," or religious emigration from a country 
ruled by infidels. An intensive campaign, not 
unconnected with local faction-feeling, seriously 
affected the portions of the Hazara District 
nearest to the border. Similar agitation, re- 
inforced by the passage through the district of 
large bodies of emigrants, or '' Nuhajirin " , from 
the Puqjab and Sindh, threw Peshawar off its 
balance, and the infection spread southwards. 
During the early summer of 1920 tens of 
thousands of the inhabitants of the Provinoe 
either performed or prepared to perform the 
''Hijrat9' to Afghanistan, in the belief that it was 
their religious duty. There is no doubt that, 
misguided as was this transitory frenzy, i t  was 
genuine in so far as minds unskilled in  reasoning 
and ignorant ,of the world-wide effects of war 
seized on an apparent affront to their faith as the 
orystallisation and climax of the various concrete 
and worldly grievances under which they 
suffered. I t  was therefore a wise policy which, 
while doing all that was possible to convince the  
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people of the fallacy and dan'gers of the 
movement, opposed no abgolute interdiction to it. 
The madness passed within a short period, sanity 
being restored by the Amir's announcement that 
his country oould receive no more of these 
immigrants and by the return of the vast 
majority of the adventurers disillusioned, destitute 
md bearing tales of the direst suffering. Large 
numbers of those who had left Peshawar and 
other districts on this pilgrimage had, before 
departure, disposed of their property for next to 
nothing and their position on return was 
desperate. The Government intervened unasked 
t o  rehabilitate these sufferers and so, in the end, 
won more than i t  had lost by the movement, in 
widespread gratitude and the removal of distrust 
and sullenness. 
Unfortunately, an agitation based on religion 
was bound to affect the peculiar temperament of 
the Frontier Mohamedan in ways not strictly 
religious. I n  Hazara the unrest spread t o  the 
trans-border tribes, necessitating military 
operations to restore order. Throughout the 
Province, and especially in Bannu, this agitation 
engendered a spirit of lawlessness and deflance 
of authority, which was aggravated by a, 
oontiuuance of bad seasons and soaring prices of 
the necessaries of life. The problem of the past 
year has been the restoration of public confldence 
in the ability of the administration to oope ~ i t h  
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this lawlessness and to safeguard the interest* of 
the agrioulturist and trader. 
811 this time and right u p  t o  the las t  days  Of 
1921 relations with Afghanistan w e r e  unse t t l ed-  
and the sketch of the history of t h e  Front ier  
which these pages have elldeavoured t o  present  
has shown, if it has shown anything a t  all, how 
this factor dominates all others. F r o m  J a n u a V  
to December 1921 the British Mission u n d e r  
Sir Henry Dobbe was in ~ a b u l  negot ia t ing,  i n  
face of an apparently unend ing  se r ies  of 
dmculties, an alliance which would  r e a c t  to the 
mutual benefit of all partiss oonoerned. Sueoess 
crowned these efforts and the  short  pe r iod  tha t  
has elapsed sinoe the signature of the Anglo- 
Afghan Treaty of November 22nd, 1821, giverJ 
ground for sanguine hope in t h e  f u t u r e  relatione 
of the two powers. With t h e  g r o u n d  thus  
cleared, it is possible to regard t h e  l o n g  Years 
from 1814 to 1921 of wars, world-wide a n d  local, 
and the aftermath thereof as ended  a n d  to  look 
forward to the resumption of i n t e r r u p t e d  
progress. 
CHAPTER PI. 
The Province and its People. 
N surveying the early and recent history of t h e  I Frontier, some of the peculiar oharacteristios 
of the country and i ts  inhabitants have emerged. 
It has been shown how the North-West Frontier 
Province came t o  be created and what its 
chequered and stormy history has been.  he' 
turbulence and, still more, the cost to the Indian 
Exchequer of the past few years have concen- 
trated a considerable weight of Press and Parlia- 
mentary criticism upon the Frontier Administra- 
tion, and the whole question of Lord Curzon's 
policy and i t s  results have come under review. 
Proposals have been put forward for complete .or 
partial re-amalgamation with the Punjab, a n d  
the arguments of those who objected to  t h e  
separation twenty years ago have been disinterred 
and set u p  as monuments of prevision. A f e w  
facts about the Province, its constitution and ' i t s  
people will perhaps help to an understanding of 
the various aspects of this controversy. 
The area administered by the  Chief Commie- 
sioner of the North-West Frontier Province ex-  
tends from the neighbourhood of that "hub " of 
the mountain systemof Central Asia, Northof Chit- 
ral, where, till two of thembecame Republics, three  
Empires met, to the oonflnes of Baluchistan 
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a length - of just over 400 miles. I n  breadth 
it is a narrow strip, whose greatest width extends, 
indeed, to 279 miles, but averages not more than 
100 miles. Nearly two-thirds of the total are@ 
of 38,686 square miles is  '(Independent Terri- 
tory," in which term is included not only the 
five flngers of the hand, which has .previously 
served as an illustration, but the unadministered 
tribal oountry between them. The boundary on 
the North, territorially part of Afghanistan, is 
actually the bulwark of the Hindu Kush, beyond 
which are the Pamirs, thence westward and 
southward the Province marches with Afghani- 
stan, till Baluchistan and the Punjab form its 
Southern limit. To the East the Indns separatee. 
i t  from the Punjab, except where the TiCazara. 
District adjoins Kashmir. The spurs of the Hima- 
laya and the Hindu Kush, linked by the low hills 
of the Mohmand country to the Sufaid Eoh 
range, which flanks the Kurram valley, are sue-. 
ceeded by the Suleiman mountains of Waeiristan. 
Wountain and hill - varying from the eternal 
snows to the low, rocky hills which are the most 
familiar feature of every Frontier landscape - 
leave room only for occasional fertile valleys over 
the greater portion of the Province. The only 
considerable plains are those of Peshawar, Bannu, 
Dera Ismail Khan and a portion of the Hazara 
District which adjoins the Punjab. Of these plans, 
Peshawar is bountifully watered by flve rivers 
and two great -and severalminor - canal systems ; 
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Bannu is half intensely fertile, half dependent 1 
upon a precarious rainfall ; Dera Ismail Khan, 
though cultivable where irrigation can be 
obtained, is, to a great extent, a barren waste. 
The reader of thie description may exclaim, in  
the light of the history of the Frontier, Why 
all this pother over a small strip of rude intract- 
able highland? " This is the argument of the 
school of politicians end strategists who would 
like to see a withdrawal behind the Indus, and 
it is beyond the scope of this, or any other, book 
to settle this age-long problem. 
As will be readily understood, the variations 
of climate and scenery in this area of mountain 
and valley, glacier and river basin are extreme. 
The rolling uplands and forest-clad hills of 
Hazers, the towering giants, blizzard-swept passes 
and solitary lakes of Kohistan and Chitral are at  
one extreme, the flat bare plains of the Derajat 
and the barren hills and stony ravines which 
oharacterise the bulk of tribal territory are at  
the other. Between these lie the fertile plains of 1 
peahawar and Bannu and valleys fllled with tho 
sound of running water, like Miranzai, the 
Kurrarn, Swat and many E lovely glen in the 
sub-montane portions of Hazara. In winter and 
spring nothing can be more delightful than the 
olimate of these plains and valleys. The clear 
atmosphere, the crisp keeneas of the snow-born 
breeze, invigorate the body, as the green expanse 
of young wheat, barley, and gram, interspersed 
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with patches of sugarcane o r  r ice-lands and 
plentiful timber delight the  eye- In summer*' 
though still verdant with the  Crops of the sea- 
son - maize, millet and ripening r i c e  - the 
swelter i n  a steamy, malarial heat  w h i c h  cannot 
be described but only experienced, whi le  the 
unwatered tracts and the boulder-s t rewn hills 
and torrent beds of Wasiristan a n d  m o s t  of the 
aotual borderland provide a f o r e t a s t e  of the 
regions of the damned which a l m o s t  breeds as 
regards a future state, the  ~ r o v e r b i a l  offspring 
of familiarity. 
The Province depends mainly upon agricul- 
ture; the towns are either impor tan t  entre-pots 
for Central Asian, as well a s  local t r a d e ,  as in the 
Case of Peahawar and Dera Ismail Khan, Or little 
more than Bazaars, grown u p  r o u n d  the Military 
Cantonments. The agricultural c l a sses  include, 
though in  numbers which t e n d  t o  decrease a? 
irrigation and other causes encourage  a more 
settled existence, a considerable propor t ion of 
nomadio or semi-nomadic graziere. T h e  winter 
population is largely swelled by i m m i g r a n t s  from 
Afghanistan, who deposit the i r  families,  camels 
and flocks in the trans-Indus dis t r ic ts ,  while 
their able-bodied men earn a good l ivelihood by 
undertaking the heavier forms of unsk i l l ed  manual 
labour or peddling cloth o r  other g o o d s  over the 
length and breadth of India, till the approach of 
the hot weather sends them t r o o p i n g  back to 
block the passes in April and May with their 
tepming caravans. 
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Out of a, population in  the settled districts of 
23 millions, 82 per cent. are Mohamedans. I n  
tr ibal area, of which no regular census has ever 
been taken, but which is estimated to  have, 
a Population of some 29 millions, the proportion 
is much higher. The non-Mohamedan element is 
composed entirely of traders, soldiers and officials. 
Among the Mohamedans, Pathans or speakers of' 
t h e  Pashtu language, largely predominate but, 
ethnographically, they are of very mixed origin. 
Wi th  Afghan, Turkish, Tartar, Persian and Indian 
strains intermingling, the only comrnon bonds 
a r e  religion and history. Both inculcate a spirit 
o f  aery independence, which is fostered by 
surroundings and conditions of life. This spirit 
ie the keynote to the understanding of the Pathan.. 
It  permeates his politics and his personality. 
Add to this the feats that the invigorating 
climate and life of his native haunts produce an 
extraordinarily high average of physique, that 
he habitually goes armed - except whore the 
law forbids him to do so-and knows how 
to use his weapons and that, in the greater 
par t  of the Province, life is so hard that the 
land could not support even the scanty popula- 
tion it produces but for the extraneous aids 
of trade, labour and military service, and the 
result is a man. This man may be a Swash- 
buokling braggart, he may be cruel, treacher- 
ous, fanatical; he may have other vices, but 
he bows the knee to  none, save to him who 
can uphold his right to be obeyed. To set 
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against hie vices the Pathan is brave, sober, 
religious according to his lights and, on the 
whole, clean living; he has a ready sense of 
humour, and great traditions of hospitality; he  
$3 a lover of sport and athletio outdoor games 
and, When his respect and esteem have been 
won, he is capable of great devotion. This 
description is of the elemental Pathan of 
Independent Territory. His cousin of the 
settled dietriots has undergone the modifications 
naturally consequent on a greater degree of 
civilisation and still further mixture of descent. 
He is inclined in youth to substitute for the 
rif le cartridge belt and dagger, of which 
British law deprives him, a gaudy waistcoat 
and embroidered shoes, gambling and other 
expensive luxuries, while later in  life he  if3 
excessively prone to litigation. But he retains 
most of the vices and virtues of his type, 
including among the latter the love of sport. 
The enthusiasm of the country people when the 
Peshawar Vale Hounds run through their flelde 
and past their villages ; the excitement when a 
"jackv is viewed; the cheery joking crowd 
which comes running to help the sportsman in 
difficulties, suggest the West of Ireland at; its 
best. Games like "Toda" and the wildly 
energetic round dances in which the Wazir and 
ghattack youths delight are the pastimes of 
athletes. 
On both sides of the border the blood-feud is 
rife. Aocording to the Pathan code of honour 
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an insult, especially if it i s  in any way7 
concerned with his women-folk, must be repaid 
i n  blood. But blood too must be paid for in  
blood, and so arise and continue for generation 
after  generation t h'e vendattas which, in tribal 
territory, conflne a man to his tower during 
the  hours of daylight for weeks and months at 
s time, and make it unsafe for him ever to 
venture abroad unarmed and, in the settled 
districts, fl11 the law courts, jails and hospitals 
with the parties to cases of murder, broken 
heads and bloodshed. 
Enough has been written of the charactoris- 
tics of the country and people to show that 
their administration presents problems quite' 
different to those of the Sunjab or other part8 
of India. First and foremost of these probleme 
i s  that of assuring the safety of the settled 
population of the plains from aggression on the 
part  of their turbulent neighbours of the hills, 
while, at t h e  same time, preserving sufaciently 
friendly relation8 with the latter to enable 
military operations to be dispensed with and the 
civilising influences of contact with British rule 
gradually t o  leaven the mass. I t  has beeli 
explained how the increase in tribal armament 
a n d  the custom of outlawry oomplicate this 
problem. The flrst of these complications admits 
of no cure, but  has necessitated a great increase 
i n  the means of protection provided for the 
defenoe of the districts. The Militia and tribal 
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levy system is of long standing. Innate in the 
sgstem of the indigenous community is the idea 
of communal responsibility for defence. Present 
policy aims at co-operation between Government 
and the people to provide a plan of defence, 
suited to the varying needs of localities and 
occasions, by a broad-based combination of 
these two systems. Subsidiary objects are the  
provision af employment for the surplus popula- 
tion and the strengthening of the n'atural and 
hereditary leaders of the people by helping them 
to organise the defence of their own boundaries. 
I n  this system Militia or Scouts, whose role i s  
to protect Government servants and property 
and to keep open Government communications i n  
tribal territory in normal times; Frontier Consta- 
bulary, who are a Military Police force; Tribal 
levies or Khassadars, to protect a special area or 
perform some speciflc duty;  and the village 
" Chigha y y  or pursuit party, all have their share. 
The '' Chigham-the Hue and Cry of old England- 
is the rawo material of the whole and i t  is the 
duty, both in custom and Frontier law, of every 
able-bodied man to turn out under his " Malik j 9  
when the " Chigha y y  drum is beaten. To enable 
these village pursuit parties to meet raiding 
gangs on something approaching equal terms, 
large numbers of rifles are issued on loan t o  
responsible persona in  villages liable to attack, 
or which lie upon well-known raiding routes. 
The outlaw problem with its accompanim6nt of 
kidnapping has been discussed in a previous 
S 0 
obapter, One aspect of this question is the 
incompatibility of British-made law and the 
Pathan code of honour. This is too complicated 
a subject to  be  discussed here, but many a 
lag all^ proclaimed "outlaw " has done no more 
than establish himself in his own and his 
neighbours7 eyee as a man of honour. 
The established remedy for this aonflict be 
tween law an& oustom is the "jirgafi" or council 
of elders, which is supposed after investigat- 
ing  the facts, to come t o  a decision which shall 
strike a fair balance between the demands of 
the  S bate and $he individual moral code. The 
" jirgah '' system is indigeneous and in tribal 
territory is still the only means of settling 
disputes great or small without reoourse to 
violence. Whatever faults or abuses in the system 
may manifest themselves in the settlement of 
cases in t h e  districts, it has the merit of bring- 
ing  a large number of men of status into direct 
touoh with  the administration to the mutual 
advantage of both sides. The whole subject of 
t he  legal machinery of the Province, inclllding 
t he  cc jirgah " system, is one on which consider- 
able aontroversy centres at the present time and 
it would be  unsafe to  prophesy the direction 
in which changes will be made. I t  is obvious, 
however, and undisputed that steps are neoessery 
t o  adjust our judicial methods to  the needs of 
the  times, and that among these steps will have 
to  be one for reconciling custom and law i n  
aortain olasses of case. At  present the "jirgah " 
aystem is necessary as the only means of mikigak- 
ing the effects of the conflict. 
Apart from these two special features of 
defence and the working of the " jirgah " system, 
tho administration of the flve settled districts 
does not differ materially in general outline from 
that of a district in  India. The charge of a 
Frontier district includes, however, the control 
of a varying extent of adjacent tribal territory 
and in this respect the duties of the District 
Offlcer are those of a Political Agent. The 
Deputy Commissioner in his political capacity 
and the Political Agents of the flve .trans- 
border agencies control the tribes in. their charge8 
by purely executive means; no legal code is in  
force and the King's writ does not run. The 
pxecutive means employed are based on the 
interests of the tribes. The object aimed at is 
to restrain them from lawless depredations on 
their more settled neighbours by the menace of 
the withdrawal of facilities for trade, 
gmployment, etc.; by assisting them ia 
settling their private or inter-tribal disputes 
according to their own customs and by paying 
them allowances i n  return for services 
rendered. This system of allowances is often 
misrepresented as sheer blackmail. I t  is not so. 
The allowanaes are given :in return for some- 
'thing definite. They may be oompensation for 
the construction of roads through tribal 
oountry, or for the infringement, by our 
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occup~tion and oontrol, of some long-standing right 
or oustom, or they may be rewards granted in  
recognition of some speoial service. The Khyber 
Afridia afford the most striking example in  
illustration of this. The British Government 
now receives in tolls from the caravan traillo of 
the Khyber much more than it paid, till 
recently, to  the tribes, who took those tolls them- 
selves in times paet, Subsequent increases t o  
the Khyber allowanoes have been as rewazds for 
the very signal service the Afridis rendered us  
by remaining staunch during the Great War, i n  
spite of every inducement to turn against us, and 
as compensation for the land compulsorily 
acquired by us for roads, railways and camps. 
Moreover all allowanoes, for whatever reason 
they may have been given, are conditional on 
oontinued good behaviour and are liable to 
forfeiture in part or in whole, if offenoes are 
oommitted. This forfeiture is the commonest 
and most effective weapon of retaliation upon a 
lawless tribe and the value of the system of 
allowances is best shown by our comparative 
impotence in dealing with those tribes which, 
are not thus subsidieed. 
The relation of some of the speaial charaoter- 
istics and problems of the Frontier Province 
brings the reader back to the question of future 
polioy. Are the conditions such as can best be 
handled as part of the problems of a large 
Province, suoh as the Punjab, or do they require 
the whole-time services of a fully-empowered 
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expert and the close pereonal a t t en t ion  of the 
Government of India. This is  the real  question 
to-day, and it should not  be obscured bY discus- 
sion of the detailed merits or d e f e c t s  of t h e  
existing Administration.  he F r o n t i e r  has never 
in its history had as 8s t w e n t y  consecutive 
years of undisturbed development. Progress 
occurred between 1880 and 1807 ; progress was  
again made between 1898 and 1914. Inevitably 
between 1814 and lgzl not only has  progress 
been Checked but in  many respects  there has  
been deterioration. Above all the Frontier has  
not remained unaffected b y  w o r l d  m 0 ~ 0 m e n t s -  
People see changes and reform all round them 
and there is apt to be some dissatisfaction wi th  
old conditions. I n  face of these historical  faeta 
and general causes, none c a n  c l a i m  that  the  
Present administration is perfect. The  decision 
to be taken is whether improvement can b e  
worked out from within o r  whe the r  a complete 
ohange of policy is necessary. 
Whatever the future may hold, the Province 
oan at any rate regard itself as f o r t u n a t e  in  one 
respect. I n  the past twenty years, n o t  only have 
men who knew it  well been especially picked 
out to rule it, but those men have stayed. Si r  
Harold Deane, E.C.S.I . ,  was Chief Commissioner 
from 1901 to 1908; his suocessor, Sir  George 
Roos-Keppel, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., a t ayed  t i l l  1919. 
Others who have held officiating charge a t  
intervels or whose term of ofllce is not yet  
complete are Mr. OPDwyer--later the pilot of the 
Sunjab through the stormy season of the war,-- 
Sir John Donald, Mr. Merk, Sir Hamilton Grant 
land Sir John Maffoy, all experts in administre. I I 
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__e_ 
Peshawar. 
HE two things which the average v i~i tor  to T the Frontier flrat wants to see are the Khyber 
Pass end Peshawar City. He probably has 
already some idea of the significance of the 
former, strategically and as a trade route. His 
mental picture of the latter is apt to be less 
deflned, but  vaguely suggestive of the Arabian 
Nights. I n  this respect he is not altogether 
wide of the mark, though he must be prepared 
for disappointments and surprises. Peshawar 
City has no great arohiteotural or scenio beauties ; 
its interest lies in  the variety of its human 
types and the multitude of their pursuits. 
Entering b y  the Kabuli Gate, the Qiasa Khrtni - 
the Street of the Story-Tellers -raises romantio 
expeotations. The street is a broad straight one 
and, exoept for the shops of dealers i n  Turko- 
man carpets, Bokhara silks and embroideries and 
the like, presents little of interest on the 
surfice. But see i t  on a Friday, with the 
whole roadway fllled from wall to wall with a . 
hundred different types of humanity, and i t  is 
an  epitome of the Frontier and its higtory. 
The camels laden with the oarpets, furs, silks, 
embroideries and gold thread of Bokhara, the 
fruits and drugs of Afghanistan, the "postins" 
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and woollen cloaks of Kabul will not be found 
here. They enter by the Bajauri gate and 
settle down in the numerous Serais in that 
quarter. But the crowd i n  the Qissa Khani 
oomprises elements of every reoe from the 
oonflnes of China to Samarcand, Merv and 
Herat mingling with Afridis, Mohmands or 
Swatis from the tyans-border tracts and towns- 
people and villagers from Peshawar and its 
neighbourhood. Threading their way through 
the crowd, perohed high upon mountainous 
saddles under whioh amble sturdy Kabuli 
ponies, come half a dozen Uzbegs - Turki- 
speaking Mongolians from far &way Kokand - 
bound on the long pilgrimage to Mecca; 
sitting round one of the many teashops with 
their huge brass or copper Samovars, are e 
couple of Jews from Herat, comparing notes 
with fellow Semitos from Bokhara and disoover- 
ing evidence of tho wonderful organisation of 
the scattered Jewish raoe i n  the fact that they 
all have letters of introduction to the same 
co-religionist in Jerusalem. On the verandah 
of a shop may be a well-to-do merchant of 
Yarkand or Kashgar, just arrived after months 
of travel, vIa Chitral and the ,  Mftlakand ana  
arranging the first steps of a transaction for 
disposing of his silks. Further up the street 
the ear ia assailed by the sound of a multitude 
of hammers tapping incessantly upon metal. 
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Turning the  oorner, the noise is Been to 
Proceed from the Copper-smiths9 BazRS', where 
i n  a 10% row sit men and  bOYsr 
oraftsmen and apprentices in  a h e r e d i t a r y  
for which Peahawar is famous. So in a ramble 
round the City are found, all co l l ec ted  i n  the 
area belonging to their guild, the bird-sellers ; 
potters with their display of g lazed  pipe-bowls 
and utensils in all variations of g r e e n ,  yellow 
and blue ; silk embroiderers ; goldsmi ths  ; shoe- 
makers busy cutting, hammering o r  s e w i n g  t h e  
handsome and much sought a f t e r  P e s h a w a r i  
shoes and c c  ohaplis with their g o l d  e m b r o i d e r y  
and gaudy silk 'Lpom-poms." In eno ther  
oorner are the shops where can be b o u g h t  t h e  
silk "lungis f l  banded in  gold and sfiver, 
favoured by the man of fashion f r o m  Calcutta 
to Kabul; near by is the " Kulla-doz quar ter ,  
where are made the round o r  p e a k e d  Caps, 
rich i n  8ilk and gold thread, on w h i c h  the  
'' lungi '' or  turban is wound. A m o n g s t  and  
around all these craftsmen wanders  t h e  motley 
throng, food for many a day's i n t e r e s t i n g  study, 
busy in  the affairs, great and  amall ,  of the  
commerce of a continent. W h e n  the open 
~ltreets and their shops have y i e l d e d  up their  
Story, there ere still behind the s c e n e s  t h e  
workshops of the potters and  the tanno1.s; 
carpenters busy on the local " p i n j r a  ?' work  - 
thin wooden strips held togother in lattice work 
'8  7 
patterns by their own pressure on each other - 
and the caravan serais packed with the squatting; 
forms of shaggy Central Asia camels and their 
loads - all the varied produce that breaks bulk 
and is transhipped from camel-back to railway 
truck at Peshawar. 
Anything of architectural value that ever 
existed in the present City of Peshawar was 
destroyed by the Sikhs at their coming. The 
only building of any antiquity that remains is 
the Gor Khatri, now the Police Headquarters, 
formerly the residsnce of Avitabile, the famous 
Sikh Governor, who, in  the intervals of hanging 
criminals by the dozen and gathering in revenue 
at the head of a Brigade of Sikh soldiery, built 
the present City wall. The Gor Khatri had 
once been a place of Hindu pilgrimage and is 
mentioned in this connection by Babar early 
in the 10th Century, but for years it had been 
, used as a Serai. The present British Fort was 
built by the Sikhs on the site of the Durrani 
Bala Hisser, which they had destroyed. 
The whole Peshawar valley ia, in one sense, 
e, mean and undistinguished structure founded 
on the ruins of a great civilisation. The 
Mohamedan invasions of the 10th and 11th 
Centuries literally devastated the valley and 
destroyed the last traces of the ancient kingdom 
of Gandhara. Where now stand mud villages, 
the mighty City o f  Puehkalavati and many another 
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of Civilisation which elioited praise from 
the early Chinese travellers of *be fifth and 
following Centuries of the Chris t ian  era,. Close 
to the site of the present Citg of peshawar was 
fhe "City of Pores," capital f o r  long 'Years 
of Gandhara and the goel of from a11 
the Buddhist world, on account of the huge 
stupe Containing the sacred relic6 whioh, ft8 
the result of recent excavations, now rest in  
the keeping of the Buddhist8 of Burma at  
xandalay. The  Frontier is r i c h  in archeolo- 
gical remains of the pre-xoha,medan ere, and 
Some of the most famous of these  are 
to be found in  the Pesh&w&r Dis t r ic t .  The 
monasteries, mausoleums and fortificcltions of 
Sakht Bahi, between Mardan a n d  the Irbalekand, 
Jemal Garhi, Sahri Balol a n d  the Khyber, 
and the rock insoribed edicts of Asoka fit 
8hahbazgsrhi, near Mardan, h a v e  disclosed to 
explorers of recent years e weal th  of SCulpt~re, 
coins, inscriptions and mural decorat ions ,  which 
have added enormously to the world's knowledge 
of the early history of India, and of the 
Hellenistic and other influences w h i c h  helped 
to shape it. 
But, with the exoeption of the Gor Phatri, 
already mentioned, there is nothing now standing 
in Peshawar of greater age t h e n  the suburban 
villrt of one of the Durreni Governors ,  whioh 
now houses the oBces of the Peshawar Brigade 
and was formerly the Residency, whence 
George Lawrence had to flee with his family 
to  Xohat, when the Sikh troops rose at the 
beginning of the Second Sikh War. Another 
Durrani building is now used as the Church 
Missionary Sooiety's school. The Cantonments 
were not laid out till 1850, after the flrsf, British 
garrison had lived for some months in temporary 
quarters to the North-East of the  City, the 
only remaining trace of whioh is an old British 
Cemetery. 
The life of Peshawar has one feature whioh 
i s  distinctive. That is its gardens. Gardening 
i n  the European style amply repays such efforts 
as the shifting British population of Canton- 
ments c a n  achieve, as e drive along the roads 
in March or April amply testifies. The Shahi 
and Wazir Baghs are flne examples of Public 
Gardens under Municipal management, but i t  
is to the miles of orchards and gardens to the 
North and South of the City that the  population 
throngs for shade in summer and for pleasant 
recreation - sometimes for less reputable re- 
creation such as gambling - in the autumn and 
spring. These orchards produae most valuable 
crops of apples, quinces, peaches and other 
fruits and are interspersed with plots of aultiva- 
tion, walled gardens and summer houses of the 
rich residents of the City. 
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From 8 point of vantage on some high roof 
top in the City, the whole va l l ey  of Peshawar 
and its surrounding hills can be t a k e n  i n  at a 
glance and much of the history of the F r o n t i e r  
can be Pictured as unrolling i tself  b e f o r e  the 
the eyes. TO the south a gap in the l o w  hills 
shows where the Kohat pass t a k e s  the road 
through a neck of Afridi c o u n t r y  d o w n  t h e  
200 miles of Frontier to Bannu and D e r a  Ismai l  
Khan. In  the villages of this P a s s  bas been  
carried on for years a flourishing t r a d e  in rifle8 
and ammunition.  he episode of t h o  Pers ian 
Gulf trade is now forgotten in  the busy o u t t u r n  
of cheap but serviceable rifles of Mar t in i -Henry  
and Lee-Metford pattern for w h i c h  t l l e re  is a 
ready Sale all along the border. P u r t h e r  along 
to the South-West are the hi l l s  of T i rah ,  the  
main Afridi stronghold, followed by t h e  
Prominent peak of Tartarra, w h i c h  d i v i d e s  t h e  
fCh~ber  Pass from the Kabul R i v e r  gorge.  The  
wall of hills continues through Mohmand 
country, round to the morth, till the gap of 
the Malakand is pioked out, b e y o n d  w h i c h  r u n  
the Buner ranges culminating i n  Mahaban,  wi th  
the Black Mountain, on the far side of  t h e  
Indus, showing snow-crowned in the d i s tance  
on a clear day in winter. Below i n  the plaina 
can be seen gleams of sunlight u p o n  water ,  
Indicctting where the Kabul r ive r  s p r e a d s  itself 
into three branches to share w i t h  the t w o  
branches of the Swctt river, a f t e r  the latter 's 
emergence from the hills a t  Abasd, the task 
- 71 
of fertilising the whole distriot from the walls 
of Peshawar itself to Ilbardan. Rorth, West and 
East of Mardan from Abazai to the Indus and, 
over the greater part of the once desert Sar-i- 
Maira now flow the transforming streams of 
yet more water from the Swat, taken off at 
Amanderr& and brought by tunnel under thw' 
Malaksnd Pass into the thirsty-plains. 
Of all this panorama, the two most significant 
points- though insignificant to  the eye at & dis- 
tance - are the Khyber and the Malakand. On 
two days in the week the road that stretches 
West from Peahawar to the foot of the hills is 
thronged with a~mels,  mules, donkeys, ponies 
and a medley of travellers - the  weekly Ehyber 
Caravan aoming to or leaving Peshawar.  he 
Khyber of to-day is crowded not only with 
aamels and pilgrims but  with the signs of its 
importenae as the strategia key to the Frontier. 
A double and, in places treble road winds up 
beneath the oliffs of Rohtas, past forte and 
picquets to the Shahgai heights, then down to 
Ali Masjid; thence through the frowning gorges 
into a more open valley dotted with the fortifled 
villages of the Z ~ k k a  Khel, till i t  emerges on 
the Loargai plateau and reaohes Landi Eotal. 
Thence it drops over Michni Kandao to Landi 
' Ehane and the Afghan boundary and disappears 
round a spur to Dacca. Alongside the road now 
rune an aerial ropeway and, sometimes u p  on 
the cliffs above the roaa sometimes below it, 
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Proceeds the work of tunnelling, outt if ig and 
embanking for the railway that is to  be. 
I n  the other direction from p e s h a w m  the 
Grand Trunk Road can be seen r u n n i n g  a w a y  
East to the Cantonment of Nowshera, whence,  
through the Cavalry station of RisalPUr and 
Mardan, the home of the Guides, r u n s  t h e  r o a d  
that winds Up over the Malakand Pass, with its 
memories of 1895 and 1897 to Chakdara. F o r t  and 
thence, a fortnight's march away, t o  ~ h i t r a l .  
So, standing in Peshawar, the Q u e e n  of the 
Frontier and the centre of i ts  life, a scene is 
unfolded that is fflled with tho his tory  of 
invasions, wars, attack, defence, t h e  march of 
S~ccesfdive waves of conquerors and the efforts to 
build a barrier, behind which tho peop le  of the 
plains and the Indian Empire may w o r k  o u t  
their political and economic destiny. W e s t w a r d s  
the index finger points up the K h y b e r  in the 
direction of danger; eastwards lie o t h e r  and. 
subtler difBculties and in both di rect ions  the 
future holds problems of which no man  c a n  t e l l  
the solution, but which will give t h e  sightseer, 
as he decends from the roof-top, mater ia l  for  
many an hour's thought, hopeful or foreboding, 
according to his temperament. 
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